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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LUCILE M. HALE, an Individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15771

RALPH FRAKES, an Individual,
Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

A.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IS LARGELY UNRESPONSIVE
TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Respondent's brief is, in large part, unresponsive
to the argument of Appellant.

It is clear that a claim

to land under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
requires that the claiming party establish four elements:
(a)

The line must be open, visible and marked by monuments,

fences or buildings,
as boundary,

(c)

(b) mutual acquiescence in the line

for a long period of years,

adjoining landowners.

(d)

by

The establishment of all four ele-

ments creates the presumption of a legally binding agreement as to the boundary, which presumption must be overcome by specific evidence that there was no agreement.
Holmes v. Judge, 31 U. 269, 87 P. 1009 (1906), Tripp v.
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Bagley, 74 U. 57, 276 P. 912 (1928).

This brief shall

point out how Respondent's brief is largely unresponsive
to the issues of law involved.
B.

RESPONDENT NEVER RESPONSIVELY DENIES THAT
THE LINE HAS BEEN OPEN, VIS IBLE AND MARKED
BY MONUMENTS, FENCES OR BUILDINGS

Appellant's brief relates the law as being that
ancient monuments may be relied upon as actual boundaries
if, under the facts, reliance upon such is reasonable.
Reliance may even reasonably be placed in zigzagging
lines when it appears that the line is reasonably the
boundary.

Respondent does not responsibly deny the exist-

ence of an ancient fenceline but only recites that the fence
was built on Respondent's property and that a prior law
suit involved this disputed land.

Testimony of both

parties-litigant at trial established beyond doubt that
the fence and its predecessor fence were of very ancient
origin.
Though it is not made clear in Respondent's brief,
his recitation that the fence was built upon his land and
that there has been a previous suit regarding the disputed
land probably goes to whether the parties could have
reasonably relied on the fence as a boundary.

By his

recitations Respondent attempts to show that reliance was
2
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-

not reasonable, because Appellant had actual and or
constructive knowledge that the true boundary was not
marked by the fence.
But in Appellant's brief the argument develops
the fact that no ordinary man would have known from the
legal descriptions of his deed that the fence was misplaced
by two rods.

Even a surveyor's surveyor presumes that

fences are correctly placed until his calculations are
complete and his determinations final.

Further, nothing

in Appellant's chain of title recites that her land is
subject to an easement for road along the disputed
boundary.

Recitations regarding an easement for road

along the West side are conspicuous and by such conspicuousness create the justified impression that if
there were an easement to the South it would have been
mentioned, and also, irregularities in the chains of title
create the impression that, in light of past courtroom
contest regarding the boundary, any disputes concerning
the boundary must have been settled and the fence had
memorialized the settlement.
None of the instant disputants nor their still living
predecessors in title had first hand knowledge of the suit.
Neither are they put on constructive notice of the result of
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such suit unless it is somehow noted in their chains of
title.

The relevant documents relate that Appellant's

predecessors quitclaimed interest in and to land in
Section 23, but Appellant and her predecessors all reasonably assumed that the fence marked the border of
Section 14 and 23.

It is expressly for this type of

dispute that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
should be applied to resolve boundary desputes in favor
of the long-lived statusquo.
The Tripp v. Badley, supra, doctrine is directly
applicable here.

The doctrine lays down no rules on what

geometric forms lines must follow; it simply states that
above all else, reliance on the disputed line must be
reasonable.

Though it would be unreasonable to rely

on the fence as the boundary now that an authoritative
survey has been performed, it was not unreasonable when
the interested parties first started using the land as
farm land.
C.

THERE HAS BEEN BOTH FACTUAL AND IMPLIED IN
LAW MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LINE AS THE
BOUNDARY

contrary to Respondent's bold assertion, factually,
there was no evidence presented at trial that Appellant's
oredecessors in interest actually knew where the true
4
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boundary line was or even that they suspected that the
fence may have been misplaced.

It is true that Respondent's

predecessor did claim that he had said something about the
fence not being on the property line, but it was not shown
at trial what he said or how it was said.

If something

truly was said, it is clear that it never brought home to
his neighbors what his argument was.

To the contrary,

Appellant's witness testified that from the time he was a
small boy working on his father's farm, they always farmed
right to the fence line:

They claimed up to,where

they

thought the section line was and always considered it as
their land.

But, very importantly, Respondent's predecessor

in title also admitted under cross examination that not once
in the long history of the fence did he ever interfere with
his neighbors' exclusive use of the land on the opposite
side of the fence, even though he was personally aware that
there was a dispute as to the exact boundary.

In any sense

of the word there was a true, actual acquiescence to the
fence as the boundary line.
As regarding the implied in law acquiescence,

respond-

ent does not answer Appellant's argument that a true and
actual acquiescence is not even required, but that if the
parties
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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" ••• have occupied their respective boundaries
up to an open boundary line visibly marked by
monuments, fences or buildings for a long period
of time and mutually recognized it as the dividing
line between them, the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do
so consistently with the facts appearing, and it
will not permit the parties nor their grantees to
depart from such line. Homes v. Judge, 31 u. 269,
87 P. 1009." Brown v. Milliner, 120 u. 16,
232 P.2d 202 at 204.
(See also, Hummel v. Young,
1 U.2d, 237, 265 P.2d 410, Ringwood vs. Bradford,
2 U. 2d 119, 269 P. 2d 1053).
from the fact that a fence line has existed for an extended
length of time arises the legal presumption that the fence
line exists where the parties have deemed the boundary line
to exist.
Further, Respondent does not ever respond to the
wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (1974) and the Baum v.
Defa, 525 P.2d 725 (1974)

line which asserts that fences

built solely to control animals and not as boundaries can
become boundaries when
•••• the property on either side of such a fence
is conveyed to separate parties, so that there
comes into being separate ownership of the tracks
on either side, and the circumstances are such
that the parties should reasonably be assumed to
adopt the fence as the boundary between their
properties, then from that time on, the time
during which the fence continues to exist, should
be regarded as going toward the fulfilling the
time requirement for the establishment of
boundary by acquiescence. Baum, supra, at 727.
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In the instant dispute the period of time contemplated
by the Baum holding began sometime before the early 1930's.
The key to why Respondent does not respond to such
arguments lies in his continued insistence that the deeds
of Appellant describe land in Section 14 and never give
title to land in Section 23.

From this, Respondent assumes

that Appellant can never reasonably believe that the fence
is the boundary, because it is clearly located in Section 23.
It is now clear that the fence is in Section 23, but only
because a surveyor's surveyor found a true

S~ction

corner

after trudging miles in all four directions and finding
obscure markers covered with mud, which no ordinary man would
have recognized for anything more than mud-covered stones.
At the time Appellant's predecessor and Appellant were
working the land the fences were the best clue to where
the boundary lay, especially in light of their ancient
existence and the undisturbed use of the land right up to
the fence and the lack of clear objection from the
Respondent or his predecessor.
D.

THE FENCE HAS INDISPUTABLY STOOD FOR A
PERIOD OF YEARS

There is no doubt that the fence has been in existence
at least since 1933, and there was also another fence in
existence before 1933 upon the same location.

This fact
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is established by Appellant's witnesses and by Respondent's
predecessor who was the one who constructed the fence in
1933 over the pre-existing fence.
E.

THE FENCE HAS INDISPUTABLY STOOD BETWEEN
ADJOINING LANDOWNERS

There should be no argument here that the Appellant
and Respondent are adjoining landowners.

Respondent does

not take issue with the argument made in Appellant's brief
that, as an adverse possession, the parties should be allowed
to tack the holding periods of their successors in title.
F.

CONCLUSION

The four elements required to establish a claim to
land by the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence were all
established at trial.

The (1)

line certainly was visible

and (3) stood for at least forty years (4) between the
adjoining landowners.
factually indisputable.

Elements one, two and four are
The major dispute lies in the

second requirement that (2) there must be an acquiescence
in the line as the boundary.
such an acquiescence.

Factually, there has been

The testimony of Appellant and her

predecessors in title, Orval Petersen, was that there was
never any doubt in their minds that the fence marked the
true boundary.

Without the aid of an official county
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survey it was more than reasonable to assume that the
fence was the true boundary-this is precisely what the
Courty Surveyor would have done according to his testimony.
Regardless of what iny of the parties-litigant have been
thinking,

for as far back as any living soul remembers,

Appellant and her predecessors have never enjoyed less
than complete, undisturbed use of all the land right to
the fence.
Also, as an implication of law there has been such
acquiescence for the law presumes agreement upon finding
that a monument has served as the effective boundary for
many years.

In order to overcome the presumption the law

requires more than a showing of no agreement.

Respondent's

predecessors did testify, though, that he had told Appellant's
predecessor that he did not consider the fence to be the
boundary line, but those to whom he reputedly told
this were men who were conspicuously dead or absent at
trial.

The brother of one who was supposedly told that

the fence was off the line testified at trial that he was
not aware that there was any dispute to the boundary and
that he, his brother and father had always farmed right to
the fence.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
9
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respondent never answers the argument now clearly
established in Utah law that a fence,

though built to

hold animals - a purpose other than marking a boundary - becomes a fence marking a boundary by acquiescence when the
tracks enter different hands than those which first built
the fence and the fence is later used as a dividing line,
such is the case here.
Upon the law and the facts the trial court has erred.
Therefore, Appellant renews his prayer for a reversal of
the court below.

Attorney for Appellant
29 South Main Street
P. o. Box U
Brigham City, Utah 84302

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing Brief of Appellant by mailing two
copies thereof, postage prepaid, to WALTER G. MANN, MANN,
HADFIELD & THORNE, Attorney for Respondent, 35 First Security
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